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The purchaser-provider split in principle and practice – 
experiences from Sweden  
Abstract 
In the public sector, market-inspired organisation, control and accounting, 
along with business-like relationships between organisational units, usually 
goes under the name of New Public Management (NPM). One organisational 
form associated with NPM is the purchaser-provider split. The model was first 
used in Sweden by county councils at the end of the 1980s. It was considered 
to be an effective and democratic method for managing Swedish health care. 
Over the past few years, researchers in many countries have begun doubting 
the model’s suitability and whether it has really been used in the way that was 
intended. However, the model is still popular in the Swedish health care 
sector. This article presents the effects of the purchaser-provider split found in 
Swedish studies. These effects are compared to the anticipated effects when 
the model was launched, and the effects of the purchaser-provider split in 
Britain. The aim of this article is to explore the effects of the purchaser-
provider split in practice. 
 
Keywords 
Purchaser-provider split, New Public Management, Health care, Managed 
market 
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Purchaser-provider split in principle and practice – 
experiences from Sweden 
Introduction 
The market-inspired organisation and control models along with the business-
like relationships between organisational units that usually go under the name 
of New Public Management (NPM) are not as prominent as they once were in 
the public sector. Renewal and the pursuit of efficiency have led to a change in 
direction in a number of countries. In certain areas, the focus has switched to 
improving democracy (Pallot, 1999). However, this does not mean that there is 
now no trace of NPM in the countries that began using quasi-market models 
first. On the contrary, many models remain in use and still have strong 
advocates. The difference now is that few (if any) consider the models to be 
the panacea for solving efficiency problems in the public sector.  
NPM is a global phenomenon that has been seen at government and local 
levels of the public sector (see Pallot, 1999). However, it has differed from 
country to country in form and in the pace at which change has occurred, not 
least in the area of accounting (Guthrie et al. 1999). As this article indicates, the 
same NPM model can also differ between countries.  
Generally, NPM as a phenomenon is characterised by fragmentation, 
competition, hands-on management and performance appraisal (Hood, 1995). 
A great deal of inspiration has been gained from the private sector. However, 
NPM has not meant a complete transition from a planned economy to a 
market economy. Observers instead talk about managed markets (see 
Akehurst and Ferguson, 1993; Maynard, 1993; Walsh, 1995; Hughes et al., 
1997; Propper and Bartlett, 1997; Barker et al., 1997; plus Flynn and Williams, 
1997). 
Criticism of NPM has come from many sides and will not be summarised here. 
We can, however, state that criticism has been both modest and fundamental. 
Examples of modest criticism are that NPM, through increased fragmentation, 
has created co-ordination problems (Pallot, 1999), implementation difficulties 
(Pettersen, 1999; Lapsley, 1999) – in particular if professionals have not 
recommended change (Groot, 1999) – and has not increased efficiency 
(Lapsley, 1999). Examples of fundamental criticism are that NPM has created 
inequality, inefficiency, increased costs and dissatisfied the general public 
(Evans, 1997). It is difficult, however, to determine which criticism is fairest, 
because there are not many empirical studies (Groot, 1999), and because 
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evaluations of NPM in certain cases have not been supported by the people 
responsible (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997; Maddox, 1999).  
One area affected by NPM is the health care sector. The intention was to 
increase efficiency in different ways for service production (Pettersen, 1999). 
The purchaser-provider split has been particularly popular in this sector. 
Consequently, this article focuses specifically on the purchaser-provider split 
and the health care sector. It aims to summarise the effects of NPM by 
presenting experiences of the introduction of the purchaser-provider split in 
the Swedish health care sector and comparing them to corresponding 
experiences in Britain. 
The next section outlines the principles and practical experiences of the 
purchaser-provider split in Britain. The section after that describes the model’s 
popularity, principles and relationships in Sweden. This is followed by four 
sections in which the model’s principles are compared with its results in 
practice. The reports are based, as they should be, on the available research 
results. However, because of a lack of research in certain areas, self-appraisals 
and consultants’ reports have also been used as reference material. In light of 
this, some of the reported effects should be interpreted with caution. The final 
section compares Swedish and British experiences, and discusses the problems 
encountered with NPM in the health care sector. 
The purchaser-provider split in Britain 
International understanding of the effects of the purchaser-provider split is 
hard to assess because the model shows significant differences between 
countries and even differences within countries (such as between England and 
Scotland [Lapsley et al., 1997]). Still, British research into the model shows 
interesting and fairly uniform results, and these are highly relevant for a 
comparison with the Swedish results. 
In Britain, the purchaser-provider split was introduced in the health care 
sector as part of the Conservative Government’s programme to create an 
internal market. The previous hierarchical structure based on directly 
governed hospitals and community services was replaced by a market-
inspired structure in which the purchasers (Health Authorities and GP 
fundholders) bought health care services from providers (trusts). The plan was 
to create market incentives and thereby increase efficiency (Locock 2000). 
The GP fundholders were to act as patient representatives; to be well-informed 
buyers of specialised care and financially responsible, which required them to 
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take finances into consideration and to be price-sensitive and responsive to 
other market signals (Ellwood 1997). The health authorities were to represent 
the local population rather than the local providers, as under the previous 
structure. This meant that it was necessary for the health authorities to 
demonstrate a democratic decision-making process, challenge the prevailing 
patterns of resource distribution between primary and secondary health care 
and clearly specify what was expected of the providers (Locock 2000). Power 
was to be transferred from the providers to the public representatives, i.e., the 
purchasers (Maddox 1999). Neither the GP fundholders nor the health 
authorities included locally elected politicians (Walsh et. al, 1997). 
The idea was that the division between purchaser and provider would solve 
the efficiency problem at the secondary care level (Fischbacher and Francis, 
1998). The purchaser-provider split, combined with contract management, was 
initially seen as a basic restructuring of the welfare state (Flynn and Williams, 
1997) and there were great hopes that contract management would mean 
huge, beneficial changes (Checkland, 1997).  
However, the studies carried out show that the reform was difficult to 
implement in practice. The aim of creating and retaining market relationships 
between purchasers and providers is considered to have rapidly fallen by the 
wayside. This was despite the purchasers being enthusiastic about their new 
role in a number of cases (Llewellyn and Grant, 1999; Maddox 1999).  
In a comprehensive study of GP fundholders, it was recognised that in 
practice the purchasers have paid limited attention to prices and other market 
signals. Waiting times, the providers’ geographical location and the quality of 
service have been given priority over prices. Another contributing factor is the 
purchasers’ reluctance to refer patients to unknown providers. However, the 
purchasers’ limited regard for prices may be due in part to the lack of financial 
pressure (Ellwood, 1997).  
Another extensive study shows that even the health authorities had difficulty 
changing their providers. A main reason for this is that local ‘political’ players 
took action to keep the providers local (Walsh et. al, 1997). 
The contracts that were to specify the terms between purchasers and providers 
turned out to have a subordinate role. Their effect as instruments of control 
has been limited, and the important decisions were made in other contexts 
(Flynn and Williams 1997; Locock 2000). Formal (hard) contracts were 
replaced by informal (soft) contracts that lacked detailed descriptions about 
the activity to be provided and clauses for penalties if the contract was 
breached (Lapsley and Llewellyn, 1997; Flynn and Williams, 1997). The result 
was that conflicts between purchasers and providers could not be decided in 
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courts of law (Flynn and Williams, 1997, Hughes et. al, 1997, Barker et. al, 
1997), which was a disappointment for the people who wanted to use the law 
to increase the financial accountability of public organisations. The contracts 
also made it difficult for the purchasers to set priorities, by showing too clearly 
what was being taken away. Explicit priorities would expose purchasers to 
far-reaching criticism from the media and the public. To some extent, the 
contracts may nevertheless have resulted in the health authorities setting more 
explicit priorities, but the main reason was that they were subject to financial 
pressure (Locock 2000). 
Instead of market relationships, other forms of relationships arose between 
purchasers and providers. It was uncommon that purchasers changed 
providers (Fischbacher and Francis, 1998) and it became more common to look 
for co-operation and relationships based on trust (Flynn and Williams, 1997; 
Flynn et. al, 1997). In this pursuit of trust, contract procedures could be hostile 
and harmful (Locock 2000), but they could also get partners who lacked such a 
relationship with each other to begin trusting each other (Lapsey and 
Llewellyn, 1997). The purchaser-provider split meant that purchasers and 
providers learned more about each other, developed partnerships, attempted 
to co-operate and worked enthusiastically together in the shaping of services 
(Fischbacher and Francis, 1998).  
One explanation as to why real competition was seldom achieved is that it was 
common for the purchasers to have a monopsony and the providers to have a 
monopoly (Ellwood, 1996). In certain cases, the purchasers (especially GP 
fundholders) felt that they were small and could not influence the providers 
(Fischbacher and Francis, 1998). In other cases, the providers felt that they 
were in the hands of individual purchasers (Akehurst and Ferguson, 1993; 
Walsh, 1995). Another circumstance explaining the lack of market 
relationships was the clear examples of hierarchical management and planned 
economy that the purchaser-provider split came to operate within (Propper 
and Bartlett, 1997). 
In cases where competition between providers was achieved, it has been noted 
that the costs for health care dropped to a certain extent (Propper and Bartlett, 
1997). Fischbacher and Francis (1998) suggest that the purchaser-provider split 
has brought about savings, but that meanwhile costs have increased for 
management, and they suggest that it is unclear if any net gain can be seen.  
One problem associated with the model is that patients of certain purchasers 
(GP fundholders) could get shorter waiting times (Flynn and Williams, 1997; 
Walsh et. al, 1997). However there are differences between England and 
Scotland (Fischbacher and Francis, 1998). The Scottish model did not produce 
any such inequities. The market there is not as volatile and the model’s main 
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effects seem to have been improved communication between primary health 
care and secondary health care (Llewellyn and Grant, 1999). However, a study 
based on interviews with representatives of GP fundholders showed no 
inequities between patients of GP fundholders and other patients (Maddox 
1999). 
To sum up, the creation of an internal market in the British health care sector 
did not generate the desired effects, but it did not have any dramatically 
adverse effects either. The reform officially ended in 1997 when New Labour 
was elected to government and published its white paper entitled The New 
NHS (Maddox 1999). It is probably fair to conclude that the New NHS ended 
the experiments with market-inspired organisation and control in the health 
care sector. The division into purchasing and providing units remained, but 
the word ‘purchasing’ was replaced by ‘commissioning’, and the contracts 
were replaced by long-term service agreements. The GP fundholders and 
health authorities were replaced by significantly larger ‘primary care groups’ 
(PCGs). The providers (trusts) were now required to collaborate rather than 
compete. Nowadays, the emphasis is on co-operation and trusting 
relationships (Giddens, 1999; Locock 2000).  
The purchaser-provider split in Sweden: prevalence, principles and 
relationships 
In Sweden, health care is largely the responsibility of county councils. In 
practice there are 21 county councils, but two of them are regions and one is a 
so-called ‘county council-free’ municipality responsible for health care. The 
councils are governed by directly elected politicians who sit on the county 
council boards. The Swedish constitution states that these organisations are 
autonomous, which means that the politicians (and managers) are able to 
make decisions about taxes, organisation, and management control systems. 
But the county councils are not entirely independent of the state. The 
government controls some of their finances and the National Board of Health 
and Welfare some of their operations.  
The purchaser-provider split was first used in Sweden in the late 1980s. At this 
time the public sector was being criticised for being inefficient and politicians 
were seen as being too involved in operational details. The purchaser-provider 
split was launched as an instrument to introduce competition to the public 
sector and to shift political control.  
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The purchaser-provider split in Swedish health care includes three 
organisational units consisting of politicians and civil servants with different 
roles. These are financiers/owners, purchasers and providers (see Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Purchaser-provider split  
The purchasers are made up of political committees, manned by politicians 
elected by the county councillors. The providers are made up of hospitals and 
health care centres, mostly owned by the county council itself. Certain 
hospitals are governed by indirectly elected politicians. Financiers/owners 
comprise directly elected politicians on the council, and the indirectly elected 
politicians on the county council boards.  
The purchasers have three important relationships. The first is with the public 
(Relationship A in Figure 1). The purchaser should represent the public and 
make sure that they receive the health care they require. By becoming 
competent at mapping the wants and needs of the population, purchasers can 
possess a competence that the provider lacks. In principle, the purchaser 
should handle the relationship with the public, and it is only when the citizen 
becomes a patient that contact is initiated with the provider. However, this 
relationship is beyond the scope of this article. 
The second relationship is with the provider (Relationship B in Figure 1). 
Through contract management, the purchaser should make sure that the 
provider actually provides the service that the public demand. Before orders 
are placed, the purchaser should find out who the competing providers are, 
specify what they want to purchase and ask for a quote. They can then sign 
contracts with the providers who provide the best service for the money. 
When the financial year draws to a close, they should evaluate how well 
things have worked (see for example Lindkvist, 1996). Because purchasers 
remain more distant from activities and day-to-day problems, they are better 
equipped to stand up to the interests of providers. Politicians in traditional 
structures were too representative and supportive of existing production 
Financer/owner 
County councillors (directly 
elected politicians) 
Council boards 
(indirectly elected politicians) 
Provider 
Hospitals and clinics 
(sometimes controlled by 
indirectly elected 
politicians) 
Purchaser 
Purchasing boards 
(indirectly elected 
politicians) 
Citizen 
A 
D 
B 
C
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(Bergman and Dahlbäck, 1995; Lindkvist, 1996). Both Relationship A and 
Relationship B are very important. It is not important what politicians do if 
their decisions are not implemented or do not achieve the desired effects 
(Lundquist, 1994).  
The third relationship is between purchasers and the financiers who are 
responsible for the distribution of resources to the purchaser (Relationship C 
in Figure 1). The conditions that the purchasers have to work under are 
dependent to a large degree on whether the financiers respect the purchasers’ 
decentralised responsibility (Leffler, 1996; Petersson, 1998). 
A fourth relationship in the purchaser-provider split is between the provider 
and owner (Relationship D in Figure 1). Owners are responsible for owner 
management of their own internal providers. However, this owner role can be 
exercised in various ways, and the scope of owner management varies among 
the individual county councils. Often, the role is limited to HR policies and 
decisions of investments. Very rarely do owners impose demands on the 
providers in terms of return on investment. 
Many researchers and practitioners in Sweden are beginning to doubt the 
model’s suitability, but it has not affected the model’s prevalence in Swedish 
health care. In 13 of the county councils (which together cover two thirds of 
Sweden’s population) a purchaser-provider split is used to organise and 
govern activities (www.bestall.net). Here we map out – in light of the British 
experience – how the model has worked in practice. Is the Swedish example a 
further indication that politicians make decisions without scientific evidence 
(Ham, 1995)? 
The relationship between purchasers and the public (A) 
It is essential for democracy that our publicly elected politicians maintain good 
contact with all members of society. This is a prerequisite for the decisions 
made by politicians to actually reflect what the public want. The purchaser-
provider split in Sweden involves an increased emphasis on democracy. An 
important question is if the split has brought about increased contact with the 
general public.  
A somewhat unexplored area 
Research into democracy in county councils began late. When Montin and 
Olsson started researching the political role of county councils in 1993, they 
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found that they were treading virgin soil (Montin and Olsson, 1994). A decade 
later not a great deal has happened. The democratic effects of market reforms 
in health care are still rarely studied by researchers. Swedish researchers have 
been strangely uninterested in the political organisation within health care 
organisations. Not even the creation of health care political parties has been 
met with any special interest among researchers (Amnå, 1999). The studies 
carried out cover far too wide a spectrum and lack focus on individual 
administrative reforms. There is also a lack of quality comparisons of 
purchasing county councils with non-purchasing county councils (Eriksson, 
1999). 
Studies that suggest an unchanged relationship  
Of the studies that were carried out, a few show that not a great deal has 
happened in the relationship between politicians and the public as a result of 
the purchaser-provider split. One of the early studies suggested that there was 
no difference between county councils using the purchaser-provider split and 
traditionally governed county councils in terms of the extent to which the 
public had contact with politicians (Montin and Olsson, 1994). Members of the 
public actually contacting politicians is roughly at the same (low) level. 
A number of studies also suggest that purchasers have not been particularly 
active in creating a relationship with the public. The propensity of politicians 
to make contact with the public has not changed (Bergman and Dahlbäck, 
1995) and the purchasing politicians consider it to be difficult to maintain a 
continuous dialogue with members of the public (Leffler, 1996). The 
purchasers do not appear to have involved the public so that they feel 
empowered in issues affecting their health (Ljungberg, 1998) and they seem to 
have limited knowledge of the needs of the general public (Eriksson, 1999). 
Bergman and Dahlbäck (2000) suggest that it is difficult to see a difference 
between county councils with a purchaser-provider split and ones governed 
traditionally, from a citizen’s point of view.  
The problems are highlighted in a case study carried out by Blomgren (2001). 
The study shows that in practice the purchaser gathered information about the 
general public’s health, their needs in relation to health care and their attitudes 
towards the health care currently being provided only to a fairly limited 
degree. In so far as that information has been gathered, it is difficult for the 
purchaser to interpret it. The purchasers therefore prefer to use material that 
they receive from the providers. The result is that the purchasers do not 
provide any new knowledge about the public’s wants and needs.  
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Studies suggesting that relationships have been affected  
There are, however, other observations that suggest that the relationship 
between the purchaser and the citizen has developed positively. This applies 
especially to studies in which the purchasers have appraised their own work. 
Five examples are given below:  
1. A survey of purchasing politicians in the middle of the 1990s shows that the 
purchasers are satisfied with how well they have succeeded in completing 
their tasks (in relation to the public) (Montin and Olsson, 1994).  
2. A similar study around the same time showed that the purchasers 
considered that they had succeeded in carrying out needs analyses, following 
trends in society and understanding the wants, needs and opinions of the 
general public (Bengtsson and Nilsson, 1995; Berglund, 1995). 
3. Another study showed that purchaser politicians, more than politicians in 
county councils organised along more traditional lines, consider that their 
contact with the public has increased (von Otter, 1995).  
4. In a study of three councils with the purchaser-provider split, the 
purchasers in two of the councils considered that contact between themselves 
and the public, primarily through patient associations, had improved 
(Bergman and Dahlbäck, 1995).  
5. One case study suggests that, by the politicians’ own assessment, their 
contact with the public has increased. This mainly concerns the politicians 
who belong to the majority and in particular those politicians active in 
purchasing functions (Pettersson, 1998). However the author of the report 
stresses that it could be in the purchaser’s best interests to portray their 
relationship with the public as better developed and more positive than it 
actually is. 
The differences between local and central purchasers  
Certain county councils in Sweden have chosen to use a more centrally placed 
purchasing unit or function, while others have chosen to appoint a number of 
local purchasers responsible for a geographical region within the county 
council. The question is if central or local purchasers are more effective in 
establishing contact with the public. This question has not been studied 
particularly well in the available research, but a study from the middle of the 
1990s gives a hint. The Montin and Olsson 1994 study compared a county 
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council with central purchasing with a county council with local purchasers. 
The differences between these two can be seen in Table 1.  
 Central purchaser Local purchaser 
Conducting needs analyses 
 
39 % satisfied 86 % satisfied 
Mapping of the public’s needs, wants 
and opinions about the service  
35 % satisfied 64 % satisfied 
Gathering data on which to base setting 
priorities  
35 % satisfied 72 % satisfied 
Table 1. The differences between local and central purchasing (Montin and 
Olsson, 1994).  
The table shows that there are significant differences between the two county 
councils. In the county council with local purchasers, the politicians are more 
satisfied with their abilities to conduct needs analyses, map the general 
public’s needs, wants and opinions about the service, and gather data on 
which to base the setting of priorities.  
It is far from certain, however, that politicians active in local purchasing 
functions have consistently succeeded better at creating relationships with the 
general public. A decentralised organisation is not a guarantee that contacts 
between politicians and the general public will increase (Eriksson, 1999).  
The relationship between purchasers and providers (B) 
The relationship between purchasers and providers is, formally speaking, built 
on contract management and evaluation. The providers are managed through 
a contract that specifies the assignment and through evaluations of how well 
the assignment has been carried out. From an efficiency point of view, it is 
important that the choice of provider has been preceded by a competitive 
tendering phase. It is important from both a democratic and efficiency point of 
view that the provider really does perform the activity ordered and formalised 
in the contract.  
A common supposition is that the purpose of contractual management in 
health care is to increase competition. The purchaser signs a contract with the 
provider who supplies the best service at the lowest price. However, it is not a 
question of increasing competition in the market, but of creating competition in 
the market. The holder of the contract, i.e., the provider, gets a local monopoly 
within a certain geographical area. The difference from before is that there is 
no need for a public provider to be responsible for production. Because 
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competition does not increase after the activity has been procured, the most 
important factor is the actual procurement or purchasing process. Efficiency 
increases in health care when the purchasing process is exposed to 
competition. It should be stressed that in county councils where there are large 
towns and cities, there is the opportunity to buy in health care (especially 
primary health care) without creating a local monopoly.  
Successes and disappointments of contractual management in county councils  
Studies of county councils that have used contractual management show both 
successes and failures. In practice it has been proved difficult for purchasers to 
get contractual management to work, as evidenced by recurring financial 
deficits. The few successes reported concern the purchasers in a county council 
being more satisfied with their possibilities to exercise control than were the 
purchasers in a municipality (Nilsson, 1993); and that in one county council 
there was a clear understanding that the purchaser-provider split increased 
the opportunities of the public to influence the scope and shape of health care 
(Dahlström and Ramström, 1995).  
The disappointments reported include the following: contractual management 
being reduced to the purchaser buying last year’s volume of care minus the 
savings required (Dahlström and Ramström, 1995; Ljungberg, 1998; Leffler, 
2002); the contract being very generally formulated (Lindkvist, 1996) and 
lacking legal enforceability, reducing the control effect because sanctions are 
lacking (Rehnberg, 1995; Dahlström and Ramström, 1995); contractual 
management not facilitating structural change (Svensson and Nordling, 1995); 
that producers, with their superior knowledge of health care, have been 
dominant (Leffler, 1996); and, that purchasers and providers have not always 
agreed, resulting in contracts not being signed and permits being issued 
without contracts (Charpentier and Samuelson, 2000). Other problems noted 
are that the providers, at least initially, were not interested in being managed 
by contract. Studies of a large county council show that in the beginning clinic 
directors were negative towards signing contracts with the purchasers, but 
that with time they became more positive (ibid). 
One circumstance that has affected the possibilities of management by contract 
is that providers have considered that purchasers have lacked the proper 
competence to procure health care in a good way. This problem was identified 
at the beginning of the 1990s when there was talk of buying and selling health 
care (Anell, 1991), but the issue is still topical (Bergman and Dahlbäck, 2000; 
Charpentier and Samuelson, 2000). The lack of competence of purchasers has 
been used as an explanation as to why providers do not trust purchasers 
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(Berglund, 1995). Providers allege that purchasers lack the medical knowledge 
necessary (Bergman and Dahlbäck, 1995) and that it is difficult for the 
purchasers to specify what they want to order (Leffler, 1996; Charpentier and 
Samuelson, 2000). Trust and competence issues have meant that many (not 
least consultants) have proposed that the purchasers’ competence should be 
increased, in order to thereby reduce the purchasers’ disadvantage in relation 
to the providers (Dahlström and Ramström, 1995). It was recommended that 
medical specialists be brought into the purchasing departments (Dahlström 
and Ramström, 1995; Svalander, 2001; Olofsson, 2001) and that medical audits 
be performed (Dahlström and Ramström, 1995).  
Another problem in the relationship between the purchaser and provider is 
that there has not always been a clear division of roles. The studies show that 
contractual management can lead to greater clarity in the division of tasks 
between politicians and civil servants (Dahlström and Ramström, 1995) but 
such clarity has not always emerged. It has instead come to light that 
purchasers take on more tasks than ordering health care (via purchasing 
agreements) and following up on the result. They also want to affect how 
production is managed, for example, through manning and training (Olofsson, 
2001) and where the service is provided (Leffler, 2002).  
Less contractual management and more cooperation  
From the middle of the 1990s the attitude of purchaser county councils to 
contractual management changed. There was less talk of formal agreements 
and competition and a lot more about co-operation and coordination, and it 
was thought that bigger hospitals were needed. A number of studies 
illuminate this:  
1. In one county council where the purchaser-provider split was introduced at 
the beginning of the 1990s, the goal of the relationship between purchaser and 
provider becoming more businesslike was replaced by the middle of the 1990s 
by the goal that the purchaser and provider, through dialogue and 
consultation, would shape the foundation of health care for the future 
(Berglund, 1995).  
2. Another study of the same county council showed that none of the key 
politicians interviewed immediately linked the split with freedom of choice, 
multiplicity of choice, and competition (Ljungberg, 1998).  
3. In a study of eight county councils, the researchers noted that purchases 
began formally, with bidding phases, negotiations and the signing of 
contracts, but that these time-consuming procedures were later replaced by 
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clear, lucid agreements characterised by a sense of solidarity (Bergman and 
Dahlbäck, 1995). 
4. In both the above studies (Bergman and Dahlbäck, 1995; Ljungberg, 1998), it 
was also established that local purchasers were forced to join forces behind 
joint orders, where they were jointly responsible for possible deficits. Instead 
of each local purchaser negotiating with the provider, the purchases were co-
ordinated.  
5. In a study of a large county council, it was established that a condition for 
the purchaser-provider split to work was that the purchaser and provider 
cooperated to create long-term trusting relationships (Dahlström and 
Ramström, 1995).  
6. A later study of the same county council established that, from the middle of 
the 1990s, competition and decentralisation of responsibility was becoming 
less important (Socialstyrelsen [the National Board of Health and Welfare], 
2000a). Instead the focus was on cooperation, and the key solutions were about 
increased cooperation in paired hospitals and clinics run by the county council 
(ibid).  
7. A study in one county council established that key civil servants and 
hospital directors did not see any connection between competition and the 
purchaser-provider split (Siverbo and Falkman, 2001). 
8. An internal study of the purchaser-provider split in one county council 
noted that the aim of developing buying/selling relationships had been 
reshaped into a quality dialogue between purchaser and provider 
(Landstinget Gävleborg [Gävleborg County Council], 2001). 
By the middle of the 1990s, it was noted that co-operation and trust were 
important qualities in the purchaser-provider split (Lindkvist, 1996). These are 
qualities that were not emphasised in the same way in early rhetoric about the 
purchaser-provider split. One reason according to Leffler (1996) that 
contractual management in its original form has been abandoned in a number 
of councils could be that the range of health care offered has not increased. 
There are few competing providers to choose from. Because the purchasers in 
practice do not have a choice when purchasing health care, they focus on 
making the existing health care function as smoothly as possible. This is why 
ideas of efficiency through co-ordination and co-operation have replaced ideas 
of efficiency through competition. And if competition is not created, then 
contractual management is considered to be unnecessarily formal.  
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Evaluation 
An important task for the purchaser is to determine through evaluations if the 
providers really are supplying the health care ordered. Whether county 
councils with the purchaser-provider split have really succeeded in this 
evaluation is unclear because there is almost no research available.  
However, there is one report that describes evaluation of health care provision 
operations across the entire county council sector (Socialstyrelsen [the 
National Board of Health and Welfare], 2000b). The report shows that in 2000, 
a comprehensive evaluation of health care was lacking. Five problems in the 
evaluation of operations were highlighted: (1) It is based on data of low 
quality, with cost accounting being particularly unsatisfactory. (2) The 
evaluations are not comprehensive. In certain activities, such as laboratories 
and x-rays, there is a total lack of evaluation. (3) The information requirements 
of only some of the interested parties, not all, are being met. There is a bias 
towards the managements of clinics on the providers’ side. Information to 
patients, the general public, purchasers and authorities is not provided 
adequately. (4) Evaluation of operations that is done is sometimes deemed to 
be unusable. Measurements and measuring methods are questioned and 
deficiencies in the information’s credibility has resulted in it not being 
accepted. (5) There is a lack of analysis, with no comments on areas such as 
equity and deficiencies.  
This report, as mentioned earlier, concerns the entire county council sector, but 
similar criticism is levelled by consultants at individual purchaser county 
councils. The criticism is that the purchasers can hardly manage if they do not 
know what the results of that management are (Olofsson, 2001).  
The relationship between financiers and purchasers (C) 
The purchaser-provider split means that politicians have new roles. The role of 
financier involves distributing resources to the purchasers, who in turn 
negotiate health care and sign agreements with providers. According to the 
principles of the purchaser-provider split, there is a clear division of roles 
between financier and purchaser, but in practice it has not worked quite so 
smoothly.  
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Lack of clarity concerning the financier and the purchaser roles  
As established earlier in this article, there have been problems concerning the 
division of roles between purchaser and provider in county councils using the 
purchaser-provider split. This problem was anticipated, however. More 
surprising was that the division of roles between politicians with different 
tasks was seen as equally problematic. The worries are about which tasks the 
purchaser and financier (the county council and the county council board) 
should have, and to what degree the financiers have the right to change the 
rules (Berglund, 1995; Dahlström and Ramström, 1995).  
There has been uncertainty irrespective of whether the purchasing politicians 
have been active in local or central purchasing functions. The problem is that 
the rules that exist in the split are not always respected. Financiers have 
sometimes considered themselves forced to take responsibility for everything 
in the county council and therefore made decisions that have not been in line 
with the stipulated rules (Leffler, 1996; Petersson, 1998). This might be the 
result of the difficulties the purchasers have experienced in being public 
representatives and responsible for budgets while patients meanwhile have 
some freedom to choose their health care provider (Bergman and Dahlbäck, 
1995).  
This is a problem that was not only apparent in the early and mid 1990s. Later 
studies show similar contrasts between purchasers and financiers (Charpentier 
and Samuelson, 2000). The purchasers felt that financiers intervened in the 
process too much, for example, deciding how to compensate for production 
over and under agreed volumes and distributing extra resources straight to 
the providers (ibid). There appears to be a contradiction in combining 
decentralised responsibility and a market model with clear elements of 
centralised management.  
Change in consumer patterns is not facilitated 
One way of reducing costs within the health care sector is to move patients 
from casualty or the emergency room to primary health care. A commonly 
held understanding is that far too much health care is run from hospitals. The 
problem is that, in many county council areas, the public are accustomed to 
visiting the casualty or the emergency room when they are sick. One challenge 
for the county councils is therefore to alter the consumer pattern. There is talk 
within Swedish Health Care of LEON ‘Lägsta Effektiva Omhändertagande 
Nivå’ (lowest effective care level), which means that purchasers and providers 
should co-operate to provide patients with primary health care.  
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Early studies of purchasing county councils established that the purchaser-
provider split did not succeed in facilitating a change in where health care was 
consumed (Brorström and Edlund, 1993). Later observations have confirmed 
this (Bergman and Dahlbäck, 1995). The purchaser’s aims of expanding 
primary health care were made difficult by central decisions that purchasers 
should purchase from existing hospitals so they could reach full utilisation 
capacity. Orders over the long-term that would mean structural changes 
involving more health care being consumed in primary health care have been 
over-ruled by the financiers. This has been more common in county councils 
with local purchasers. In county councils where the purchasing function is 
centrally located, the purchasers have been given greater freedom to influence 
structural issues (Bergman and Dahlbäck, 1995).  
The relationship between owner and provider (D) 
So far this article has dealt with the purchasers’ relationships with the public, 
financiers and providers. There is more and less comprehensive research 
concerning these relationships. However no research has been carried out 
concerning the last relationship to be dealt with in this article. The relationship 
between owner and provider has so far actually only been scrutinised by 
consultants. 
Their reports emphasise the significance of owners actively managing 
providers. In this case it is a question of the kind of management that is 
supplementary to what purchasers do in making their purchases. Consultants 
do not arrive at the same conclusions about how the owner management 
should be organised. One report emphasises the importance of a strong and 
centralised owner who opposes sub-optimising (Svalander, 2001). The report 
points out that all (county council-owned) hospitals are planning to solve their 
financial problems by expanding, which is unreasonable considering that 
purchasers do not have the resources to order health care to such an extent. 
Another report states that owner management should be decentralised to each 
individual hospital, because otherwise it will be difficult to create competition 
(Olofsson, 2001).  
Other observations made about owner management are as follows: that there 
are few formal contacts between owner and hospital, but informal contacts do 
occur at top-level management (Olofsson, 2001); that owners have neglected 
their task of making hospitals more cost-effective (Svalander, 2001); that 
politicians who sit on the county council boards (as owners) are also members 
of health care committees (as purchasers), which means that the politicians 
might put their interests associated with their role as purchaser ahead of those 
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associated with their role as owner (Olofsson, 2001); and that there is 
uncertainty surrounding which department is responsible for structural issues 
(Mueller, 2001; Olofsson, 2001; Svalander, 2001).  
Discussion 
The purchaser-provider split appears to have been introduced with high 
expectations in both Britain and Sweden. The rhetoric surrounding the model 
in both countries suggests similar expectations of the results of market-
inspired organisation and control. However, the reform was initiated at 
different levels. In Britain, it was introduced as the result of a government 
initiative, while in Sweden, the decision was made by the individual county 
councils who use the model. While the impact of this difference is hard to 
assess, both countries appear to have found it difficult to make use of the 
market mechanism. 
When the purchaser-provider split is used in Swedish health care, it is 
important that the relationships work between purchaser and citizen, 
purchaser and provider, purchaser and financier, and owner and provider. It 
is important to ask how the relationships work in practice and if there are gaps 
in knowledge about the effects of the purchaser-provider split. This article has 
discussed the problems associated with the various relationships, and a 
comparison with experiences in Britain shows that several of the problems 
found in Sweden are not unique. 
Researchers are not sure how well Swedish purchasers have succeeded in 
establishing contact with the general public. Case studies based on the 
purchasers’ views show that the purchasers are generally satisfied with their 
achievements. Meanwhile other studies, where it is not the purchaser who is 
being asked, show that purchasers often fail to provide information for setting 
priorities and making contact with the public. Britain appears to have focused 
less on this relationship, perhaps because the NHS does not include locally 
elected politicians. 
According to the principles of the purchaser-provider split, the relationship 
between the purchaser and provider must be organised in the form of 
contractual management and be preceded by a competitive purchasing 
process. The purchaser should evaluate activities to make rational decisions in 
the next purchasing process. In practice, the split became something different 
from competition, contractual management and evaluation. In both countries, 
it was unusual for the contracts to be efficient instruments of control, for 
providers to compete with each other, and for purchasers to change their 
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providers. Later on and to a large extent in both Britain and Sweden, the idea 
of competition was replaced by ideas of co-operation and co-ordination, which 
require relationships based on trust. In Sweden, this happened spontaneously, 
while in Britain, it first happened spontaneously, at least to some extent, and 
was subsequently formalised under the New NHS. 
It remains a problem in Sweden that the providers perceive that the 
purchasers have insufficient competence, do not want to set priorities and 
avoid discussing the content of purchases. In addition, the purchasers have 
concentrated too little on evaluation. This applies to the entire county council 
sector, but the problem is greater in county councils using the purchaser-
provider split because the order process requires a sound knowledge of how 
the providers manage their tasks.  
It is difficult to base a control model on competition when there is a lack of 
alternative providers. This becomes even more difficult when large sections of 
the health care sector are structured in a way that restricts exposure to 
competition (Lindkvist, 1996; Walsh et. al, 1997). It becomes more difficult still 
when both major and minor purchasers are reluctant to change their 
providers. These are observations from both counties. In Sweden, because the 
contracts were signed with the county council’s own hospitals, it was 
considered to be unnecessary to sign commercial-type agreements and legally 
binding contracts. Instead, just like in Britain, a crossover to soft contracts and 
limited competition was the final course of action.  
The relationship between purchasers and financiers, which is especially 
interesting in the Swedish case, has concerned whether the financier respects 
the purchasers’ decentralised responsibility and how the purchasers take 
responsibility. The relationship between central and local instances has been, 
and still is, a stumbling block to the application of the purchaser-provider 
split. In this context, it is important to add that such problems are not just 
specific to county councils using the purchaser-provider split. The problem in 
the relationships between local and central players is evident in all public 
organisations. However, it can be established that the purchaser-provider split 
has not diminished these problems.  
The relationship between owner and provider is also an area in which studies 
are lacking in Sweden. This is in spite of the conditions for owner management 
of hospitals, in particular where this concerns structural issues, cost-efficiency 
and range of service, having been centralised. However consultants who have 
written about owner management have established that weak owner 
management can lead to expansion, causing increased production capacity 
without the purchaser being given the opportunity to purchase all the health 
care available.  
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Conclusions 
The aim of this present article has been to illustrate the impact of NPM by 
describing the consequences of the purchaser-provider split in the Swedish 
health care sector, and by comparing these consequences with those in the 
British health care sector. Despite a certain lack of studies, it can be established 
that there is a clear difference between the principles launched by the model 
and the practice that the researchers have found.  
Of course it is easy to dismiss an administrative management tool if it proves 
not to generate the desired effects and possibly even increases transaction 
costs. But a less rigid assessment leads to the conclusion that the content of this 
article does not, at least in the Swedish case, provide enough evidence to 
justify the abolition of the purchaser-provider split. There are three reasons for 
this. The first is that more, better-designed studies are needed. The second is 
that it is uncertain whether the split is better or worse than other alternatives 
available. A model should not be discounted because it has not achieved the 
set goals, but because there are other models available that are better. It is 
hardly fair to compare a model with an ideal because ideals by definition are 
unattainable. The third reason is that the model should not be criticised 
because the users choose to abandon some of its principles. On the other hand, 
if principles are abandoned because they are unrealistic then it constitutes 
serious criticism of the model.  
The purchaser-provider split in Sweden is both an expression of NPM and of 
aims of increasing democracy. The split’s elements of NPM – in the form of 
competition, a purchasing process, contractual management and evaluation – 
have not been successful. There are no indications that the purchaser-provider 
split has increased efficiency within health care. One explanation of why the 
split remains in use to a large extent in Swedish health care may be that the 
politicians in the purchaser county councils – despite the researchers’ doubts – 
consider the split being a democratic improvement. The purchaser-provider 
split remains in use to a large extent within Swedish health care, but its 
elements of NPM are limited.  
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